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Despite legal restrictions, attorneys continue to use peremptory challenges to strike minorities 
from juries (Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; 
Gabbidon, Kowal, Jordan, Roberts, & Vincenzi, 2008).  The current protection against racially 
motivated peremptory challenges provided by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) has not been effective 
in reducing racial discrimination during voir dire and social scientists have yet to identify a 
suitable procedure for reducing the bias.  The present research examined if methods used in 
reducing discrimination in industrial and organizational psychology can have a similar impact in 
a legal setting.  Participants viewed venirepersons who varied in race, attitude and gender.  
Participants rated how likely it would be for them to use a peremptory challenge on each 
venireperson and then chose two to exclude at the end.  Venireperson attitude was the only 
significant predictor of likelihood ratings and exclusion.  Several possibilities are explored to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Racial bias remains in the justice system despite legal interventions intended to remedy 
the problem. For example, minority defendants are convicted more frequently and receive longer 
sentences (Mustard, 2001; Williams, Demuth, & Holcomb, 2007).  One possible reason for the 
large disparities in convictions is that Black individuals are vastly underrepresented on jury 
panels (Baldus et al., 2001; Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Equal Justice 
Initiative, 2010; Gabbidon, Kowal, Jordan, Roberts, & Vincenzi, 2008). Discrimination against 
Black defendants by White jurors not only leads to more guilty verdicts but also to a greater 
likelihood that Black defendants will be sentenced to death (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & 
Gaertner, 1997; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Lynch & Haney, 2000; 
Schuller, Kazoleas, & Kawakami, 2009).  The disparity between Black and White individuals on 
a jury is not accidental and can be partly attributed to how attorneys select jurors. 
 During voir dire, attorneys have two methods to remove potential jurors from a jury.  The 
first method is a challenge for cause.  An attorney can ask the judge to remove a venireperson if 
it appears that the juror is biased towards their client or cannot be fair and impartial.  Challenges 
for cause are unlimited but attorneys must provide a justification for the challenge and the judge 
must agree that there is cause to excuse the potential juror.  The second method available to 
attorneys is a limited number of peremptory challenges.  Attorneys do not need to provide any 
reasoning for their decision but they may not excuse a juror based on race or gender (Batson v. 
Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 1994; Powers v. Ohio, 1991).  Despite these prohibitions, 
attorneys continue to make race-based peremptory challenges without much interference from 
the courts.   
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One reason attorneys are still able to dismiss jurors based on their race is because the 
legal protection provided by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) is inadequate. If opposing counsel is 
suspicious that peremptory challenges are being used to eliminate venirepersons because of their 
race, they can raise a Batson challenge.  Then, the attorney needs to provide a race neutral 
justification for the challenge.  However, it is not difficult for attorneys to generate acceptable 
race neutral explanations; in fact, the explanations do not need to be “persuasive or even 
plausible” (Purkett v. Elem, 1995, p. 768).  Therefore, it is unsurprising that in one field study 
judges accepted around 80% of race-neutral explanations provided by attorneys and only 17% of 
Batson challenges involving a Black venireperson were successful (Melilli, 1996). In North 
Carolina, although non-racial variables influenced peremptory challenges, none were as closely 
related to the likelihood of dismissal as were race (Grosso & O’Brien, 2012). Because current 
preventative measures such as the Batson challenge are rarely successful in diversifying a jury 
(Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Melilli, 1996), it is time to look at other procedural remedies to 
effectively reduce discrimination. 
 Certainly, concerns about eliminating discrimination are present in legal contexts other 
than jury selection.  In particular, social science research has been useful in providing insights 
into successful practices for minimizing discrimination in employment contexts. Just as it is 
illegal to remove venirepersons from the jury pool because of their race (Batson v. Kentucky, 
1986) and gender (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 1994), it is illegal for employers to make hiring or 
promotion decisions based on race, gender, or religion (Civil Rights Act, 1964; Civil Rights Act, 
1991). One intervention that has been promising for reducing discrimination in hiring decisions 
is increasing the accountability of decision makers. The likelihood that individuals will make a 
decision based on stereotypes decreases when they know beforehand they will be held 
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accountable for their decision (Ford, Gambino, Lee, Mayo, & Ferguson, 2004; Nadler, Lowery, 
Grebinoski, & Jones, 2014). The present research is designed to investigate if accountability can 






















Chapter 2: Background on Race in Peremptory Challenges 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of all White juries in Strauder v. West Virginia 
(1880). Strauder was a Black man convicted of murder by an all-White jury.  He appealed his 
conviction arguing that the West Virginia statute excluding Black individuals from serving on 
any jury violated his 14th Amendment rights.  He further argued that because Blacks were not 
eligible to serve on a jury he was not tried by a jury of his peers in the same manner that a White 
defendant would be.  This differential treatment was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the 14th Amendment.  The Supreme Court agreed, holding that discriminating against Blacks 
during jury selection because of their race was unconstitutional.  Thus, the Court set precedent 
that Black citizens could serve on juries. 
 The Strauder decision focused on Blacks being eligible for jury service but did not 
address whether it was permissible for attorneys to dismiss them from a jury after voir dire at 
different rates than White jurors or the burden of proof required by the defense to claim racial 
discrimination.  It was not until nearly a century later that the Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges (Swain v. Alabama, 
1965).   In Swain, the petitioner was a Black man convicted of rape and sentenced to death.  He 
appealed arguing that his 14th Amendment rights were violated because the prosecution used 
peremptory challenges to remove all six eligible Black venirepersons leaving him with an all-
White jury.  The Supreme Court ruled that using peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude 
Black venirepersons was unconstitutional but that the Swain failed to show a systematic use of 
peremptory challenges against Black venirepersons over time.  Therefore, the Court established 
that defendants must show that State excluded Black venirepersons from the jury in their specific 
case and must establish evidence of repeated discrimination in other cases.  
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Batson v. Kentucky (1986) revisited the burden of proof established in Swain.  Batson, a 
Black male, was charged with burglary and receipt of stolen goods.  During voir dire, the 
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to dismiss the four Black venirepersons.  Batson 
appealed his conviction on the grounds that his 6th (right to an impartial jury) and 14th 
Amendment rights were violated.  The State Court affirmed the conviction stating that Batson 
did not meet the burden of proof set forth by Swain to prove discrimination.  Batson appealed 
and the case was brought before the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts and established new burden of proof 
requirements.  They decided that a defendant no longer had to prove systematic discrimination 
by the prosecution.  Instead, a defendant could argue that their 14th Amendment rights were 
violated if the prosecution used peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors due to race in 
their specific case.  Furthermore, the Court outlined necessary steps to determine if peremptory 
challenges were racially discriminatory. A defendant must establish that he is part of a 
cognizable racial group and that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges to dismiss 
members of the defendant’s race.  Once the defense establishes a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution.  Then, the prosecution must explain 
the peremptory challenge by providing race neutral justifications for the dismissal.  Lastly, the 
trial judge makes a decision as to whether the peremptory challenges were racially motivated and 
thereby unconstitutional. 
On a superficial level, it appears that courts have embraced the Batson decision.  Courts 
have extended Batson’s reach in decisions holding that venirepersons cannot be dismissed 
because the defendant is of a different race (Powers v. Ohio, 1991) or gender (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 
1994).   The Supreme Court has also ruled that Batson violations existed in two landmark cases 
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(Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005; Foster v. Chatman, 2016).  In Miller-El, the prosecution dismissed 19 
of the 20 eligible Black venirepersons; 10 were excused through peremptory challenges.  The 
Court noted “The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible 
African-American venire members…Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity” (p. 
432).  Perhaps more important than the rate of exclusion of Blacks was how the prosecutors 
justified their peremptory challenges.  For example, the prosecution argued that they dismissed 
Black venirepersons because of certain race neutral reasons (family members with criminal 
history, views on rehabilitation and the death penalty) but did not dismiss White venirepersons 
with the same characteristics.  Therefore, because the prosecution only dismissed Black 
venirepersons for things that also applied to White venirepersons, it appears that the true reason 
for the peremptory challenge was racially motivated. 
Similar discrepancies were noted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Foster v. Chatman 
(2016).  The prosecution justified removing a Black venireperson because he had a son the same 
age as Foster but did not have a problem with White jurors who also had sons the same age as 
Foster.  Perhaps the most damaging evidence was the notes the prosecutor took during voir dire.  
The notes highlighted potential jurors who were Black, notes with an “N” (for no) next to the 
names of all Black prospective jurors, and a draft of an affidavit from an investigator comparing 
the Black potential jurors stating “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors [this 
one] might be okay” (Foster v. Chatman, 2016, p. 1).  It is clear that the prosecution’s trial 
strategy was motivated by explicit biases and stereotypes about Black people.   
Although the Supreme Court upheld Batson in these specific cases, it would be erroneous 
to believe that the protections afforded by Batson are sufficient or without major problems. 
Notably, Batson challenges are rarely successful (Melilli, 1996).  Failed Batson challenges are 
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partly due to the fact that a sufficient race neutral reason is easy to provide.  For example, after 
two Black jurors were dismissed and the defense cited Batson in objection, the prosecution 
explained the potential jurors’ facial hair was suspicious.  The Supreme Court upheld the strikes 
and said that race-neutral explanations do not need to be “persuasive or even plausible” (Purkett 
v. Elem, 1995, p. 768).  If courts do not always recognize explicit bias, how is it possible for 



















Chapter 3: Explicit and Implicit Bias in Voir Dire 
Attorneys may be acting on explicit or implicit biases during jury selection.  Explicit 
biases are considered conscious and purposeful but implicit biases occur automatically and are 
unconscious (Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001).   Implicit biases are most likely to be expressed 
in behavior when the situation is ambiguous, the behavior can be justified through non-racial 
explanations, and individuals are taxed cognitively (Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen, 
1999).    
Attorneys may consciously rely on stereotypes when predicting how jurors will vote 
because there is some empirical evidence illustrating in-group preferences.  One meta-analysis 
found juror bias toward other-race defendants.  Specifically, there was a small but significant 
racial bias reflected by participants giving longer sentences and voting guilty more often when 
the defendant was of a different race from their own (Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005). 
Although the effect was smaller than in previous meta-analyses (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; 
Sweeney & Haney, 1992), studies conducted since have provided additional evidence of out-
group bias.  White mock jurors imposed harsher sentences, including the death penalty, on Black 
defendants than White defendants (Dovidio, et al., 1997; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Forsterlee, 
Forsterlee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Lynch & Haney, 2000; Schuller et al., 2009). Attorneys are 
likely aware of the potential for jurors to hold in-group biases and their discrimination in jury 
selection stems from an explicit trial strategy to exclude a category of jurors who is known to be 
biased against their case.  
 However, juror decision-making is more complex than simple favoritism towards one’s 
own group.  For example, Black and White mock jurors read a trial summary about a defendant 
who murdered his White wife.  The defendant’s race was manipulated to be either White or 
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Black.  There were no significant differences between how the Black and White jurors rated the 
Black defendant.  However, Black jurors were more likely than White jurors to find the White 
defendant guilty (Skolnick & Shaw, 1997).  Similarly, in a study in which mock jurors read 
about a negligent homicide, White participants did not rate the Black defendant differently than 
the White defendant but Black participants gave higher guilt ratings to the White defendant 
compared to the Black defendant (Abwender & Hough, 2001).  One explanation for the results is 
that Black juror were exhibiting racial bias and White jurors were not.  However, using the 
aversive racism framework, White jurors may have been policing themselves in such a manner to 
not appear racist towards a Black defendant.   
 According to aversive racism theory, bias towards Blacks is most likely to be expressed 
by Whites when it can be justified on non-race related grounds (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).   
Aversive racism theory explains that most White individuals will make a conscious effort to 
avoid appearing racist.  However, despite genuine egalitarian values and an explicit rejection of 
stereotypes, it is difficult to suppress bias toward Black people under certain circumstances 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).   Discrimination is more likely to occur when a situation is socially 
ambiguous and the appropriate behavior is unclear. The justification model of prejudice similarly 
explains that although White individuals are not likely to commit overt acts of racism, they will 
express prejudice through discrimination when it can be justified on nonracial grounds (Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003).    
An early study demonstrated negative consequences stemming from aversive racism 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).  White participants viewed a staged emergency in which the victim 
was either Black or White.  Additionally, participants either believed they were the only witness 
or believed there were additional White people who saw the situation.  Consistent with aversive 
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racism theory, when participants believed they were the sole witness they helped the Black and 
White victim with the same frequency.  However, when participants thought there were other 
witnesses, providing a reason other than race to not help the Black victim, participants helped the 
Black victim 50% less often than the White victim (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).   
Aversive racism also effects juror decision-making.  For example, White and Black mock 
jurors read trial scenarios in which the defendant was White or Black (Sommers & Ellsworth, 
2000).  The trials were also manipulated such that race was either salient or not in the crime.  In 
the salient condition, White jurors gave similar guilt ratings to the White and Black defendant 
whereas Black jurors gave higher guilt ratings to the White defendant compared to the Black 
defendant.  However, in the non-salient condition, both White and Black jurors showed in-
group/out-group bias.  White jurors gave the Black defendant higher guilt ratings compared to 
the White defendant and Black jurors gave the White defendant higher guilt ratings compared to 
the Black defendant. The race of the juror and defendant similarly affected sentencing 
recommendations.  Black jurors gave the Black defendant shorter sentences than the White 
defendant and White jurors gave the White defendant shorter sentences than the Black defendant.  
Therefore, when race was not an obvious issue, White mock jurors may not have been 
consciously trying to avoid appearing racist and as aversive racism theory predicts, reacted in 
discriminatory ways.  
Another study illustrates the complexity of aversive racism effects.  Mock jurors were 
presented with a case with a White or Black defendant.  When participants were told DNA 
evidence was ruled inadmissible and to disregard it, participants who were judging a Black 
defendant rated the defendant as more guilty, recommended longer sentences, and rated the 
defendant to be more likely to reoffend than did those judging a White defendant.  However, 
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when the DNA was admissible, there were no differences in judgment between participants 
judging the White defendant and Black defendant conditions (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & 
Gaertner, 2005).  Furthermore, for the Black defendant, inadmissible DNA evidence was more 
detrimental than admissible DNA evidence.  It is possible that when trying to suppress the 
evidence, mock jurors became cognitively fatigued.   Because mock jurors were already 
cognitively taxed, they may have experienced more difficulty in reducing their bias leading to 
higher ratings of guilt.   Additionally, scores on a Modern Racism scale (measuring explicit bias) 
did not moderate any of the effects.  These results are consistent with aversive racism 
predictions; participants’ self-reported racism measures did not predict discrimination toward the 
Black defendant, participants took advantage of using non-racial reasons to discriminate against 
the Black defendant, and a high cognitive load made it more difficult to suppress bias.  
 Aversive racism effects reach beyond the judicial system.  For example, White 
participants read parts of an interview and rated the suitability of Black and White candidates for 
a position.  The candidates were manipulated to be very strong, moderate, or very weak.  
Supporting aversive racism theory, there was no discrimination towards the Black applicant 
when the candidates had strong qualifications or weak qualifications for the position.  However, 
when the candidate was moderately qualified the participants recommended the White applicant 
significantly more than the Black applicant (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).   
 Cognitive load is an important factor in the ability to suppress acting on biases and 
stereotypes.   For instance, when participants were not under cognitive load, regardless of 
prejudicial attitudes, they penalized White defendants more often than Black jurors.  However, 
when participants were under a high cognitive load, prejudiced mock jurors penalized the Black 
defendant more often that the White defendant (Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012).  In another 
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study, participants read about a criminal act in which the suspect was either a respected bank 
employee or was a “hard drug addict” and rendered verdicts and sentences.  When participants 
were under a high cognitive load, they voted guilty more often and gave harsher sentences to the 
drug addict compared to the bank employee.  However, when the participants were under a low 
cognitive load, there were no differences between suspect type in verdict or sentences 
(Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen, 1999).    
Regardless of explicit or implicit attitudes and motivations, some attorneys do appear to 
use in-group/out-group racial stereotypes explicitly during voir dire.  Some trial technique 
manuals suggest that attorneys use venireperson demographic information such as age and 
education to predict how they will judge a case (Mauet, 2002; Rothblatt, 1961; Haydock & 
Sonsteng, 1999).  In fact, the Supreme Court found the Texas jury selection manual allowed 
prosecutors to ask potential jurors different questions based on their race.  Because the questions 
for Black venirepersons were intended to elicit answers that would provide attorneys with race 
neutral reasons for excluding them, the varying questions were one way to mask explicitly 
racially motivated peremptory challenges (Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005).  However, there is reason 
to believe attorneys’ implicit attitudes may also influence their decisions during voir dire. 
 Researchers have investigated whether attorneys are consciously aware of their 
motivations when they exercise their peremptory challenges.  Participants (students, law 
students, and attorneys) were presented with two potential jurors in a mock trial in which the 
defendant was Black. One juror was Black and the other was White.  Knowing they had one 
peremptory challenge left, participants overwhelmingly dismissed the Black juror compared to 
the White juror.  However, less than 10% of participants reported race as the reason for dismissal 
(Sommers & Norton, 2007), citing instead, for example, features of their employment history.  
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These results are informative on two fronts.  First, race clearly influenced peremptory challenges 
with Black venirepersons being excluded significantly more often than White venirepersons.  
Second, 96% of participants gave race-neutral reasons when asked to explain their decision.  It is 
not clear whether attorneys were simply unaware of their motivations or that they did not want to 
admit they excused a venireperson because they were Black.  Either way, even if a Batson 
challenge is raised by the defense, attorneys could easily provide race-neutral justifications to the 
court and to themselves.  
 Attorneys performing voir dire may be especially prone to making biased decisions due 
to aversive racism.  Jurors provide information other than their race that an attorney could use to 
explain a peremptory challenge. Furthermore, it is not always clear what the egalitarian decision 
is, particularly when attorneys have motivations to not only appear unbiased but also to win their 
case.  It is unlikely that current protections against discrimination during voir dire are effective if 
attorneys are acting on implicit biases, especially when discriminatory behavior can be explained 
through race neutral reasons.  Moreover, it appears that simple explicit warnings may not prevent 
discrimination as intended. 
There has been at least one study investigating if an explicit reminder of the Batson 
decision reduced racial bias in attorneys’ exercise of their peremptory challenges (Kennard, 
2011).  Practicing attorneys were presented with two venireperson profiles and informed they 
had one peremptory challenge left. One juror was White and the other juror was Black.  
Additionally, attorneys were either reminded that it was unconstitutional to make jury selection 
decisions based on race or did not receive the reminder.  Those attorneys who did not receive the 
reminder excused the White venireperson significantly more often than the Black venireperson. 
Those who received a Batson reminder dismissed the White and Black venireperson with the 
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same frequency. These results are inconsistent with previous work (Sommers & Norton, 2007) 
because there was bias toward excluding White venirepersons and not Black venirepersons.  It is 
possible that two Supreme Court decisions that upheld Batson (Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005; Snyder 
v. Louisiana, 2008) affected the attorneys in the Kennard (2011) study; the attorneys studied by 
Sommers and Norton (2007) were not exposed to those decisions. Both studies found that 
attorneys rarely listed race as a justification for their peremptory challenge indicating that 
attorneys either did not want to appear racist or were unconsciously making decisions.    It is 
important to recognize that although a Batson reminder reduced the racial discrepancies of 
venirepersons struck, other research indicates explicit warnings are not effective in reducing 
discrimination. 
 In another study examining peremptory challenges and explicit warnings, participants 
were asked to act as prosecutors in a case in which a woman was on trial for murdering her 
abusive husband.  Participants were more likely to exclude the female venireperson compared to 
the male venireperson and then provide gender-neutral justifications when asked to explain their 
decisions.  The addition of an explicit warning that a venireperson could not be dismissed due to 
their gender did not reduce the likelihood that the female venireperson was excused.  Participants 
continued to exclude the female juror significantly more than the male juror but gave more 
elaborate gender-neutral justifications for their peremptory challenge (Norton, Sommers, & 
Brauner, 2007).  It is important to remember that there is no explicit reminder about Batson prior 
to jury selection; it is unlikely that the potential for a Batson challenge would deter 
discrimination if explicit instructions do not necessarily have that effect. 
 The Batson decision was intended to make racially motivated peremptory challenges 
more difficult, however the Supreme Court made faulty assumptions about the effectiveness of a 
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Batson challenge.  Attorneys do not need to explain their motivations for a peremptory challenge 
unless opposing counsel raises Batson challenge.  If that happens, attorneys are unlikely to admit 
they dismissed venirepersons because of their race; attorneys know it is unconstitutional to do so 
and likely do not want to appear racist.  Furthermore, as explained by aversive racism theory, 
attorneys may not be purposefully excluding Black jurors but unconsciously relying on 
stereotypes. Batson assumes that judges will be able to detect attorneys’ implicit or explicit 
motivations.  However, given that attorneys can use any number of race neutral explanations for 
dismissal, including a reason as implausible as suspicious facial hair (Purkett v. Elem, 1995), 
judges would have to be mind-readers to determine the true reason for the challenge.  As there is 
no evidence suggesting judges can detect attorneys’ implicit biases, the legal system needs to 
explore procedures other than Batson challenges to prevent racially biased peremptory 
challenges. 
Voir dire can be viewed as a hiring process in which serving on the jury is the job.  
Attorneys want to “hire” individuals whom they believe will act and think in a way that will be 
beneficial to them. Analogous to attorneys, employers are not legally permitted to make 
decisions based on an individual’s race, gender, or religion (Civil Rights Act, 1964; Civil Rights 
Act, 1991) However, similar to attorneys and juries, employers and companies are susceptible to 
biased decision-making leading to discrimination in the workplace. 
 The American Psychological Association (APA) addressed discrimination in the 
workplace in its Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) amicus brief. The brief explained that 
stereotyping under certain conditions could create discriminatory consequences for stereotyped 
groups (in this case women in the workplace).  The APA provided two types of conditions that 
promote stereotyping in the workplace that can also be present in jury selection.  In an evaluation 
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setting, the rarity of the stereotyped individual can make it more likely they will be perceived as 
acting in a stereotypical way.  Looking at voir dire as an evaluation setting, the rarity of Black 
venirepersons can be a factor in jury selection. Black individuals were systematically excluded 
from death penalty cases involving Black defendants (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010).  Therefore, 
if a Black individual does make it to voir dire, the infrequency may influence attorneys to rely on 
stereotypes (e.g. Black jurors will be unable to be fair and impartial if the defendant is Black).  
The brief also reported that the paucity of information available to evaluators increases the 
likelihood of discrimination.  Paucity was a three-pronged definition. First, the information is 
limited beyond some convenient category (gender or race).  Second, the information available is 
ambiguous and can be interpreted in multiple ways.  Last, information available about the 
individual is irrelevant to the judgment the evaluator must make.  Like rarity, paucity is also 
present in jury selection.  There is a narrow range of juror information available to attorneys and 
it can be unrelated to how a potential juror will perform.  
 The APA also listed conditions in which there would be a reduction of stereotyping and 
discrimination in the workplace, which may translate into jury selection.  These conditions 
included providing additional information about the employee and increasing attention to that 
information.  It is reasonable to think that more information about a juror could reduce 
stereotypic thought, however if the information is irrelevant to the juror’s decision making, the 
brief predicts that it could contribute to an increase in discrimination. The APA promoted 
instilling motivational incentives to discourage discrimination.  One motivational incentive that 
has reduced discrimination in the workplace is accountability.  Is it possible that holding 
attorneys accountable, more than they currently are, will decrease the likelihood of racially 
motivated peremptory challenges? 
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Chapter 4: Accountability 
             Accountability is a two-pronged concept defined by the expectation that one may need to 
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others and implies that there will be consequences 
for actions depending on the individual’s justifications (Semin & Manstead, 1983; Tetlock, 
1992).  Attorneys may be unmotivated to control biases and continue to use racially motivated 
trial strategies because there are no serious consequences for selecting jurors based on race.  
Attorneys are aware they may need to produce race neutral reasons for challenging 
venirepersons, but they are also aware that they are not held accountable in any real sense 
because there are limited consequences if attorneys lose a Batson challenge. One repercussion is 
the challenged venireperson becomes a juror with the possibility of a not guilty verdict..     
            Additionally, predecisional accountability has the strongest effects on decision-making 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  It is impossible for accountability to affect decision-making if a 
person only becomes aware of it after they have made a decision.  Because a Batson challenge 
can only be made after a racially biased strike, it is unlikely to affect decision-making. Is it 
possible that informing attorneys before voir dire that they will be fully accountable for their 
decisions would minimize racial bias in jury selection? 
 Holding people accountable reduces bias in employment settings (Boudreau, et al., 1992; 
Ford et al., 2004; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Nadler et al., 2014; Pendry & Macrac, 1996).  
White sales managers evaluated two equally qualified applicants; one applicant was Black and 
the other was White.  The White applicants received more favorable ratings compared to the 
Black applicant when participants knew they did not need to justify their evaluation.  However, 
when participants were informed they would need to justify their evaluations to their supervisor, 
they rated Black and White applicants the same (Ford et al., 2004).  Participants also rated a 
 18 
heterosexual applicant more positively than a homosexual applicant when they were not held 
accountable but there were no differences in ratings when participants were held accountable 
(Nadler et al., 2014). Although there is support that accountability can attenuate bias, it would be 
erroneous to think that it is a “social or cognitive panacea” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 270).  
Several factors influence the effectiveness of predecisional accountability. 
 The flexible contingency model (FCM) of predecisional accountability explains that 
accountability can sometimes increase biases while at other times decrease them (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999).  According to FCM, predecisional accountability attenuates bias when people 
expect to justify their judgments and want to avoid looking foolish to others.  To accomplish this 
goal, individuals engage in effortful cognitive processes to reasonably justify their actions.  
Individuals look for relevant information, anticipate counter arguments, consider them 
impartially, and monitor the cues that are allowed to affect decision-making. When a decision is 
originally made without self-critical attention to the judgment process but the decision requires 
greater attention to the information provided, accountability reduces bias (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999).   
 Furthermore, accountability may also increase individuals’ accuracy in predicting others’ 
behavior, which would be beneficial to attorneys.  Participants were presented with 16 
“impression formation phase” responses from actual test takers on a personality-prediction task 
and asked to predict how the individuals would respond to an additional 16 items presented in 
the “personality-prediction phase”.  Participants were assigned to a no accountability condition 
(they knew their answers were confidential), a preexposure-accountability condition (they 
learned they would need to justify their answers before viewing any test responses) or a 
postexposure-accountability condition (they learned they would need to justify their answers 
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after seeing the responses).  Participants in the preexposure-accountability condition made 
significantly more accurate predictions about the second set of responses compared to those who 
were in the no accountability or postexposure-accountability conditions (Tetlock & Kim, 1987).  
It is important to note that although participants in the postexposure-accountability condition 
were aware they would need to justify their answers before responding, the accountability 
manipulation failed to increase accuracy in their predictions. Therefore, parallel to the effects of 
predecisional accountability on decision-making, accountability may also be more effective in 
preventing bias than correcting for it (Tetlock & Kim, 1987).  Because a Batson challenge can 
only be raised after a decision, it is unsurprising that it has little impact on reducing bias.  
However, if attorneys know before voir dire they will be accountable for their choices they might 
be more likely to evaluate the relevant information and impartially consider counter arguments, 
resulting in fewer racially motivated peremptory challenges.  
 The FCM also explains and predicts when accountability amplifies bias. Accountability 
can increase bias is when people rely on irrelevant cues (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  The desire to 
avoid appearing foolish compels people to use all cues about a person, even ones that are not 
related to a task.  Additionally, cognitive load can lead to an increase in discrimination because 
of implicit biases (Knippenberg, Dijksterheuis, & Vermeulen, 1999).  For example, participants 
were asked to predict a student’s grade point average after reading personal profiles.  The 
information they received included relevant information (e.g., how many hours the student 
studies) and irrelevant information (e.g., the number of plants the student owns, how frequently 
he plays tennis).  Participants who believed they would be interviewed after the study 
(accountable condition) were more likely to rely on the irrelevant information when predicting 
GPA compared to those who were promised confidentiality (non-accountable condition; Tetlock 
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& Boettger, 1989).  In an attempt to prepare themselves for evaluation, participants gathered as 
much data as possible, regardless of relevance.  The accumulation of all possible data could be 
problematic if attorneys pay attention to information that is irrelevant to their performance as a 
juror. 
 Accountable people sometimes rely on stereotypes as cues resulting in discrimination. 
Accountable participants were more likely to consider the age of a candidate as an informative 
cue when evaluating job applicants, resulting in more negative evaluations of older than younger 
applicants.  Unaccountable participants did not exhibit the same judgment processes (Gordon, 
Rozelle, & Baxter, 1988).  In addition, accountability may make attorneys more biased during 
voir dire if being accountable increases their cognitive load.  If so, it is possible that accountable 
attorneys may be able to avoid explicit reliance on information about race when making decision 
but will be unable to correct for implicit racial biases.   
Although attorneys may be correct that people of certain races tend to hold certain 
attitudes, not every member of that race will subscribe to those beliefs. Attorneys may overlook 
individual venireperson attitudes, even if they are favorable to their side, because of an explicit 
trial strategy fueled by an overreliance on stereotypes about racial attitudes. Will accountable 
attorneys look beyond race when a venireperson expresses attitudes inconsistent with racial 







Chapter 5: Audience 
Individuals seek general approval and acceptance from others (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995).  Therefore, it is unsurprising that the decision-maker’s audience can impact their choices.  
For instance, when decision-makers know their audience’s views, they tend to make decisions 
that are consistent with those views (Tetlock, 1983).  Participants were asked to describe their 
position on affirmative action, defense spending, and capital punishment.  Participants in the no 
accountability condition were informed their responses were confidential.  In the three 
accountable conditions, participants were told that they would need to justify and explain their 
answers to another subject who was either liberal, conservative, or took an unknown position. 
The views of the other subject (audience) influenced responses such that participants who 
believed they would be discussing the topic with a liberal reported more liberal attitudes and 
participants who believed they would be discussing the topic with a conservative reported more 
conservative attitudes (Tetlock, 1983).   Consistent with other accountability research (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999), participants in the three accountability conditions reported more complex 
thoughts than participants in the no accountability condition.  However, participants in the 
unknown audience accountability condition reported the most complex thoughts.  It is possible 
that participants were more likely to weigh both sides knowing they would need to justify their 
own views because the audience was unknown.  These results are consistent with the idea that 
individuals prefer to use less cognitive resources when making decisions and if the audience’s 
opinion is known, they will simply align with the audience’s preference (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; 
Tetlock, 1985).  
 When the audience is interested in how an individual comes to a final decision, 
individuals are more likely to use effortful strategies when evaluating information compared to 
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when the audience is exclusively interested in outcomes.  If the audience is interested in the 
process in which an individual came to a decision instead of exclusively examining the final 
decision, accountable individuals will search for additional information analysis to justify their 
choice (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996).  Participants were asked to 
role-play as a trial lawyer in a case in which their client wants to cease treatment for an incurable 
disease.  Participants read descriptions of a set of jurors, each juror paired with a description that 
contained information about seven cues (e.g., age, education, gun ownership) and then 
determined how likely it was that the potential juror supported assisted suicide.  Participants in 
the procedural accountability condition were informed that the cues they decided were important 
would be displayed on a screen and they would engage in an interview explaining why they 
made their decisions.  Participants in the outcome accountability condition were told they would 
receive feedback about their decisions and if they performed well they would receive a bonus of 
$10, but there was no mention of an interview.  Participants in the no accountability condition 
were told their responses were confidential.  Participants in the procedural accountability 
condition used more of the available information when making judgments than those in the 
outcome accountability condition and were more accurate compared to those in the “outcome 
accountability” condition.  Importantly, participants used information that included both relevant 
and irrelevant cues, consistent with the idea that individuals have difficulty disregarding 
irrelevant information when it is made available (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).  Furthermore, 
participants in the outcome accountability condition had the poorest accuracy scores suggesting 
that if individuals believe the audience is only concerned with the final result, they in turn will 
not engage in effortful thought processes and are unlikely to be accurate when predicting 
behavior (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996).   
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 Attorneys are likely to be concerned with the outcome of their decision during voir dire 
for at least two reasons. First, before attorneys are required to explain their decision to a judge 
(audience) opposing counsel needs to actually raise a Batson challenge. Otherwise they do not 
need to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. Data illustrates the rate in which opposing 
counsel raises a Batson challenge is low (Office of Indigent Defense Services, 2016) and 
attorneys are aware of that fact.  Second, attorneys are also knowledgeable that judges are likely 
to overrule a Batson challenge if it is raised. In North Carolina, only 3% of Batson challenges 
were sustained among over 150 death row inmates despite evidence of racial disparity in the vast 
majority of the cases (Stubbs, 2016). Because attorneys understand they are unlikely to need to 
explain their decisions and that their audience is likely to side with them, it is foreseeable that 
they would only be concerned with the outcome of their decision and not engage in thoughtful 
processing of relevant information apart from race. 
Currently attorneys are not accountable for their decisions during voir dire in a way to 
deter racial bias.  However, it is clear that accountability can be effective in reducing 
discrimination due to implicit bias and increase critical thinking under certain circumstances.  
These conditions are not currently met in jury selection.  First, a person needs to be aware of the 
accountability before making a decision in order for bias reduction to occur (Lerner &Tetlock, 
1999; Nadler et al., 2014; Tetlock and Kim, 1987).   During voir dire, if attorneys need to 
provide a race neutral explanation, they are only aware of it after decision-making. Second, the 
type and amount of information affects the ability to ignore stereotypes.  When accountable 
people have both relevant and irrelevant cues to consider, they are more likely to overemphasize 
irrelevant cues and may revert to decision-making based on implicit stereotypes (Gordon, 
Rozelle, & Baxter, 1988; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).  Because the 
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bias is implicit, people justify their decision with more elaborate explanations (Norton et al., 
2007). Attorneys may rely on a venireperson’s race and the accompanying stereotypes such that 
they ignore other more relevant cues.  If attorneys do need to justify their decision, it is possible 
that their explanation simply includes more irrelevant race neutral information than would be 
provided if there were fewer extraneous cues.  Third, the decision-maker’s audience affects 
decision-making.  If the audience’s views are known, accountable individuals are likely to make 
decisions consistent with the audience’s (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Tetlock, 1983).  Furthermore, if 
the audience is not concerned with how the decision-maker came to their decision, it is unlikely 
that an accountable individual will examine cues relevant to their choice (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 
1996).  Attorneys know their audience, a judge, is unlikely to hear why they removed a Black 
juror. If attorneys do need to provide an explanation they know that the judge will likely accept 













Chapter 6: Overview of the Proposed Research 
U.S. courts have addressed jury diversity over the past several decades (Batson v. 
Kentucky, 1986; Foster v. Chatman, 2016; Peters v. Kiff, 1972) but archival data and empirical 
research indicate that the corrective measures currently in place are distressingly ineffective.  
Blacks continue to be underrepresented on juries despite the availability of a Batson challenge  
(Baldus et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2007; Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Gabbidon, et al., 2008). If 
raised, Batson challenges are rarely won because attorneys only need to provide a race neutral 
reason for excusing a venireperson to successfully overcome the challenge (Melilli, 1996). 
Importantly, these reasons do not need to be believable for a judge to accept them (Purkett v. 
Elem, 1995). Given the emerging research on the improved quality of jury deliberations among 
diverse juries (Lynch & Haney, 2011; Sommers, 2006) and the Constitutional right to serve on a 
jury and be judged by a panel of peers, it is imperative that we look to other remedies in reducing 
racial bias in peremptory challenges. 
 The goal of the research is to test the hypothesis that attorneys will exhibit less implicit 
racial bias in peremptory challenges when they know they beforehand that they will be held 
accountable for their decision-making.  There is reason to believe accountability will only be 
effective in reducing bias if attorneys are aware of the consequences prior to decision-making 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  We also examined the effects of accountability to the effects of a 
Batson reminder on attorney decision-making when faced with rating potential jurors.  Batson 
warnings reminding participants of the law regarding peremptory challenges have been both 
effective (Kennard, 2011) and ineffective in reducing bias (Norton et al., 2007). However, 
making attorneys accountable instead of simply reminding them of the law may be the most 
effective way to reduce bias.  We examined the likelihood that attorneys would report racial bias. 
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According to aversive racism theory (Gartner & Dovidio, 1986) and previous research, (Kennard 
2011; Sommers & Norton, 2007), it is more likely that attorneys will provide race neutral factors 
compared to racially motivated factors when explaining their decisions.  
The present study expanded on Kennard (2011) and Sommers & Norton (2007) 
methodology.   Participants were presented twelve venireperson profiles with pictures varying in 
race, gender, and attitude.  They rated each potential juror on a 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 
(extremely likely) Likert scale on how likely they would use a peremptory challenge on that 
juror.  After viewing all twelve profiles participants chose two venirepersons to use their 
peremptory challenges on and gave a short explanation.  The current study explored the effects 
of accountability and audience on reducing racial bias in attorneys’ decision-making. 
 I hypothesized an interaction between accountability, venireperson race, venireperson 
attitude, and judicial record with different patterns of results depending on whether the Black 
venirepersons hold attitudes that are pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or neutral.  Specifically, when 
the judge has a record of overruling Batson challenges, attorneys without accountability will be 
significantly more likely to dismiss or want to dismiss Black jurors than will accountable 
attorneys, irrespective of venireperson attitudes; accountable attorneys will be influenced by the 
venireperson’s attitude and not their race.  When the judge has a record of upholding Batson 
challenges, venireperson’s attitudes and not his/her race will affect attorneys’ decisions to strike, 
irrespective of attorney accountability.  Lastly, the manipulations will not affect the nature of the 
explanations attorneys provide for dismissing a juror.  The frequency of race neutral reasons will 




Chapter 7: Methods  
 I created venireperson profiles that were distinctly pro-defense, pro-prosecution, or 
ambiguous for Study 1.  I conducted a pilot study to guarantee that participants perceived the 
twelve profiles I created as intended. 
Participants 
 I recruited participants (N = 10) for the pilot study from the Graduate Psychology 
Department at John Jay College.  I excluded data from one participant because they 
misunderstood the instructions, resulting in nine participants. 
Design and Materials  
 I created the twelve venireperson profiles by varying the venirepersons’ occupations and 
their responses to the Juror Bias Scale (JBS; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983, see Appendix A).  
From data gathered by the Washington Post (2015), I selected occupations that are more likely to 
be held by individuals with liberal, conservative, or neutral political and social views.  The four 
occupations that were paired with pro-defense profiles were social worker, midwife, union 
organizer, and yoga instructor.  The four occupations that were paired with pro-prosecution 
profiles were petroleum geologist, urologist, car salesman, and farmer.  The four occupations 
paired with ambiguous profiles were plumber, motel owner, pilot, and pawnbroker.  
I also varied the venirepersons’ responses to the questions on the JBS so that they 
indicated the venireperson held pro-prosecution, ambiguous, or pro-defense attitudes.  For 
example, venirepersons who were pro-defense disagreed, strongly disagreed, or very strongly 
disagreed to the statement “out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty for the 
crime for which they are charged”.  Pro-prosecution venirepersons responded that they agreed, 
strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed to the same statement and ambiguous venirepersons 
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responded that they neither disagreed nor agreed.  Appendix B has all twelve venireperson 
responses to the JBS. 
Procedure 
 Participants clicked on a Qualtrics link that informed them that they would be reading 
profiles of potential jurors and evaluating them.  Specifically, they were asked to adopt the role 
of a prosecuting attorney and rate the profiles for how favorable they would be to the 
prosecution’s side on a scale of 1 (Extremely Unfavorable) to 7 (Extremely Favorable). The 
profiles of potential jurors were randomly presented and rated one at a time.  After completion, 
participants were thanked for their time. 
Results 
Data Analytic Strategy 
 I collapsed the twelve venireperson profiles into three sets (pro-prosecution, ambiguous, 
pro-defense) by taking the mean of the four profiles in each category.   Then, I conducted a 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Favorability 
 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been 
violated, X2 (N = 2) = 3.35, p = .19.  There was a significant linear trend, F (2,7) = 127.97, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .94, such that the 3 sets were all significantly different from each other.  Specifically, 
participants rated the pro-defense venirepersons (M = 1.92, SD = 0.70) to be less favorable to the 
prosecution than the ambiguous jurors (M = 4.19, SD = 0.65), p < .001, d = 3.57, 95% CI [3.27, 
3.89].  Participants also rated the pro-defense venireperson to be significantly less favorable to 
the prosecution than the pro-prosecution venirepersons (M = 6.03, SD = 0.44), p < .001, d =7.56, 
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95% CI [7.20, 7.71].  The ambiguous venirepersons were also rated as significantly less favorable 




Two hundred forty-nine prosecutors and law students completed the survey. I found 
prosecutors’ emails online and from other researchers conducting studies with attorneys.  I 
emailed them asking if they would like to participate in the study and provided a brief 
description of the task and compensation.  The link to the survey was embedded in the email (see 
Appendix C).  
Law students were eligible to participate in the study if they had experience with mock 
voir dire or had taken a class or seminar covering jury selection. I emailed faculty at 85 law 
schools throughout the county, requesting that they send an email to their current students or 
students they may have previously taught who were still in school.  I also asked if I could send a 
recruitment email on the school’s listserv. The link to the survey was embedded in these emails. I 
also posted about the study on social media (Facebook). 
Design 
 The study featured a 3 (Judicial record: judge likely to overrule Batson challenges vs. 
judge likely to uphold Batson challenges vs. control) × 2 (Accountability: present vs. absent) × 
2 (Venireperson Race: Black vs. White) × 2 (Venireperson Gender: male vs. female) × 3 
(Venireperson Attitudes: pro-prosecution vs. pro-defense. vs. ambiguous) mixed factorial design 
with all 3 venireperson variables being within-subject manipulations.  Judicial record and 
accountability were between-subjects variables. 
Materials 
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 Venireperson faces. Twelve faces were selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, 
Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015).  The database is intended for scientific research and provides 
high-resolution, standardized photographs of males and females from different races and 
ethnicities.  All faces were shown from the shoulder up wearing a grey top. Norming data were 
available for each individual.  These data included information about race and age as well as 
subjective ratings of attractiveness by independent judges. Attractiveness was rated on a 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely) scale (for more about the Chicago Face Database see Ma et al., 2015) 
 I chose 3 White male faces, 3 White female faces, 3 Black male faces, and 3 Black 
female faces that were similar in age (perceived age ranged from 21 years-old to 30 years-old) 
and attractiveness.  A t-test revealed attractiveness did not significantly differ between the 6 
White faces (M = 3.86, SD = .01) and the 6 Black faces (M = 3.80, SD = .07), F (2,10) = .71, p = 
.42, d= 1.25, 95% CI [1.23, 1.27].  
 Venireperson profile. I used a 12 x 12 Latin Square design to counterbalance the 12 
(three pro-prosecution, three pro-defense, 3 ambiguous) juror profiles from the pilot testing with 
the black and white faces.  Each of the twelve faces were paired with each of the twelve distinct 
juror profiles once such that every profile appeared equally as often with a man and woman and 
Black and White person.  Specifically, the attitudes (pro-prosecution vs. pro-defense vs. 
ambiguous) were fully crossed with race (Black vs. White) and gender (male vs. female).  
Furthermore, the order in which juror profiles appeared was randomized to prevent order effects. 
Qualtrics Survey Design. The Qualtrics program randomly assigned participants to one 
of twelve different “chutes” corresponding with one of the arms of the Latin Square design.  
Each chute held the profiles of twelve potential jurors that varied in attitude (pro-prosecution, 
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ambiguous, or pro-defense) paired with the individual pictures that varied in race and gender as 
specified by the Latin Square design. 
Summary of Case Facts. Participants read a brief description of the defendant and 
victim in the case and a summary of case facts (see Appendix D).  I used the trial scenario from 
Norton and Sommers (2007).  A Black defendant was charged with one count of battery with 
serious bodily injury.  The prosecution claimed that the defendant broke into the victim’s house, 
grabbed a lamp, and repeatedly hit the victim with it during an interrupted robbery.  The 
Caucasian victim could not identify the defendant but blood and hair with DNA were left at the 
scene.  The defense claims that because there was no positive identification someone else was 
the attacker and questioned the validity of the DNA results. 
Accountability.  Participants in all conditions were told that a sample of attorneys had 
previously rated the juror profiles for their favorability to the prosecution and that they were 
eligible for a $15 bonus if their two peremptory challenges matched the juror profiles that 
attorneys had rated as being the least favorable to the case.  Participants in the accountability 
present conditions received additional instructions stating that a panel of legal professionals 
would review their peremptory challenge decisions and if a participating judge believed that the 
decisions were biased they would not be eligible for the $15 bonus.  Participants in the 
accountability absent conditions did not receive any additional instructions beyond the potential 
for the $15 bonus. 
Judicial Record.  Participants in the judge likely to overrule Batson challenges condition 
read that the judge reviewing their decision had overruled Batson challenges 75% of the time 
they were raised (siding with the prosecutor).  Attorneys in the judge likely to uphold Batson 
challenges condition read that the judge reviewing their decision had upheld Batson challenges 
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75% of the time they were raised (siding with the defense). Participants in the judge control 
condition read that they should proceed to the next page and received no information about 
judicial record.                                                
Dependent Variables 
Probability of Strike.  Participants rated the likelihood that they would use a peremptory 
challenge after viewing each profile on a scale of 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely). 
Final Peremptory Challenge Decision. After viewing all twelve profiles, participants 
were asked to select the two jurors that they would like to use their peremptory challenges on.  
They were instructed that they could review the jurors’ profiles before making their decision.   
 Justification.  An open-ended question asked attorneys to explain their peremptory 
challenge decisions in about thirty words. 
 Demographic Information.  Each participant provided basic demographic information 
including age, gender, geographic location, an estimate of the number of voir dires in which they 
had participated, and if they were currently a law student. 
Procedure 
Participants clicked on the Qualtrics link that took them to the study.  Participants read an 
informed consent and those who wished to continue could do so by clicking on the “next” 
button. (see Appendix E). Next, Qualtrics sorted participants into one of the twelve combinations 
of juror profiles and photos. All participants played the role of a prosecuting attorney in a case 
for which they had two peremptory strikes.  To add an incentive to decide as they would in a real 
case, subjects were informed that if they removed the jurors who were pre-rated as damaging to 
the prosecution, they would receive an additional $15. Participants read a brief description of the 
defendant and victim in the case and a summary of case facts.  Next, participants in the 
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accountability present condition received the accountability warning described above. 
Participants in the accountability absent condition did not receive that information.  Then all 
participants read about the judicial record of the presiding judge (or not if in the neutral 
condition).   
Participants viewed potential jurors one at a time and rated the likelihood that they would 
use a peremptory challenge on that juror on a scale of 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely 
likely).  After participants repeated the process for all twelve profiles, they chose the two 
potential jurors they would use their peremptory challenges on.  Participants provided written 
explanations for their decisions in thirty words or less.  Last, participants answered an attention 
check (“did you play a prosecutor or defense attorney in this study?”), demographic questions, 
were debriefed, and provided compensation information.                                                                                     
Data Analytic Plan 
Likelihood of striking.  Due to a programing error, the within-subjects design was not 
fully crossed as planned. Therefore, instead of viewing twelve distinct venireperson profiles (a 
combination of race × attitude × gender), participants viewed some combination of eight distinct 
profiles with the remaining four profiles being repeats of a previously viewed race × attitude × 
gender combination (for the specific breakdown of the presentation of profiles, see Appendix F).  
For example, participants in Block 1 did not see the within-subjects combination of a Black male 
who held pro-prosecution attitudes. To be clear, participants did not view the same profile or 
picture more than once.  Although participants were not exposed to a fully crossed within design, 
every within condition was presented across the full dataset.  Consequently, instead of using 
ANOVAs as planned, I analyzed the data with hierarchal linear models (HLM). 
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 The HLM computes estimates for each combination of conditions to which a participant 
was exposed.  The full crossing of conditions within the dataset as a whole means the HLM is 
able to compute an estimate for each combination; because each combination is present for two-
thirds of the participants, the estimate for each combination is based only on the two-thirds of the 
sample that was exposed to that combination.  The HLM makes these calculations without 
needing to impute or replace any observations.  The between-subjects analyses, which test the 
primary hypotheses, are based on the full dataset.  Any interaction of a between-participants 
factor and a within-participants factor takes advantage of the HLM’s properties as described 
above. 
 Final exclusion analyses.  I analyzed the final peremptory choices using a mixed effect 
logistic regression and frequencies. 
 Justification analyses.  Two independent research assistants, blind to hypotheses, coded 
the participants’ short answers explaining their exclusion decisions.  The coding scheme 
included four sections (race, gender, occupation, and attitudes) with several subsections (see 
Appendix G). The researchers indicated when a short answer included those items by marking a 
1 in a spreadsheet.  Researchers marked a 0 if the short answer did not include an item. I 
resolved any discrepancies between the coders. I analyzed participants’ open-ended responses 
explaining why they struck the two venirepersons using binary logistic regressions.  I conducted 
separate binary logistic regressions for each of the four major categories coded as a reason for 
striking and used accountability and judicial history as predictors.  I also included all the 




Chapter 8: Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
In total 249 people completed the survey. Nine participants failed the attention check and 
were removed from analysis. Participants (N = 240, 102 men, 135 women, three preferred not to 
answer) consisted of 93 prosecutors and 147 law students from 33 different states. Participants 
varied in their experience in conducting voir dires. Nearly half (n = 122) had only participated in 
mock voir dires, but 50 participants had conducted 31 or more voir dires (Table 1). The majority 
of participants were between the ages of 20-30 (68.3%) compared to participants over 31 years 
old (31.7%).  The sample was ethnically diverse but the majority of participants identified as 
Caucasian (Table 2). 
Likelihood to exclude venirepersons. 
I used R statistical software to analyze participants’ ratings of how likely they would be 
to exclude venirepersons. Specifically, I used the “lme4” package with the “lmer” function 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). I computed the p-values using the “lmerTest” 
package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, Christensen, 2017), and calculated degrees of freedom using 
the “Satterthwaite” method (Satterthwaite, 1946). I ran a mixed model to test Hypothesis 1 and 
entered accountability, judicial instructions/preference, race, attitude, and their interactions as 
fixed effects. I used successive difference contrasts. The primary results of interest in these 
analyses are the unstandardized regression coefficients for the condition indicator. These 
coefficients represent estimates of the expected population mean difference between the 
conditions on the outcome measure. Using these estimates, I derived estimates of the 
standardized mean difference (i.e., Cohen’s d) between the groups by dividing the coefficients 
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by the residual standard deviation from their respective regressions. I will refer to this analog of 
Cohen’s d as 𝑑′ (Gettings, 2017; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2017). 
 Venireperson attitude was the only significant predictor of participants’ ratings of how 
likely they would be to exclude a venireperson. The difference in likelihood to exclude between 
pro-defense and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.59, p < .001, t (235.66) = 49.68, 
d’= 2.85, 95% CI [2.79, 2.99]; participants were more likely to exclude pro-defense 
venirepersons compared to ambiguous venirepersons. The difference between pro-prosecution 
and pro-defense venirepersons was also significant, b = -4.08, p < .001, t  (236.06)= -78.34, d’= -
4.49, 95% CI [-4.71, -4.28]; indicating participants were less likely to exclude pro-prosecution 
venirepersons compared to pro-defense venirepersons. The remaining main effects and 
interactions were not significant (see Table 3). 
 In order to provide the strongest test of whether the 3-way interactions differed by race, I 
analyzed the 3-way interaction of judicial instructions, accountability, and attitude within each 
level of race. I ran HLMS separately on the data for the black and white venirepersons, entering 
accountability, judicial instructions, attitude, and their interactions as fixed effects. Venireperson 
attitude was the only significant predictor on participants’ ratings of how likely they would be to 
exclude a venireperson. Among black venirepersons, the difference in likelihood to exclude 
between pro-defense and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.54, p < .001, t (224.01) 
=27.68, d’=2.82, 95% CI [2.62, 3.02]. The difference between pro-prosecution and pro-defense 
venirepersons was also significant, b = -4.00, p < .001, t (231.92) = - 34.69, d ‘=-4.45, 95% CI [-
4.69, -4.19].  The remaining main effects and interactions were not significant (see Table 3).  
 Among white venirepersons, the difference in likelihood to exclude between pro-defense 
and ambiguous venirepersons was significant, b = 2.59, p < .001, t (224.01)= 31.18, d’=2.78, 
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95% CI [2.60, 2.95]. The difference between pro-prosecution and pro-defense venirepersons was 
also significant, b = -4.15, p < .001, t (231.92)= -39.04, d’=-4.46, 95% CI [-4.69, -3.75]. The 
remaining main effects and interactions were not significant (see Table 3). 
 I calculated the estimated marginal means in R using the emmeans function in the 
emmeans package (Lenth, 2018).  As can be seen in Table 4, attitude is the only significant 
predictor in likelihood ratings.  The 4-way interactions were not significant nor were the 3- way 
interactions within race.  There were no meaningful differences between black and white 
venireperson ratings.   
Final exclusion decisions 
I analyzed the choice outcome using a mixed effects logistic regression, using the glmer 
function from R’s lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) with the binomial family and logit link to 
investigate which venirepersons attorneys chose to exclude after viewing all twelve profiles. 
Standard significance testing for the full 4-way interactions was not possible due to the large 
standard errors owning to the extreme imbalance in choices between attitude conditions (Table 
5). However, the effect of attitude is clear; participants chose to exclude pro-defense 
venirepersons 435 times out of 477 total exclusions.  Participants chose to exclude ambiguous 
venirepersons 24 and pro-prosecution venirepersons 18 times out of 477 total exclusions.   
Qualitative responses 
 Participants explained their exclusion decisions by noting venirepersons’ attitudes more 
than any other reason.  Of those attitudes, participants were more concerned about the 
venirepersons mistrust of the police and criminal justice system than any other attitude.  Notably 
no one stated gender as a motivating factor for their exclusions and race was only mentioned five 
times.  See Table 6 for the full frequency breakdown of reasons cited.   
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 I analyzed participants’ open-ended responses using binary logistic regressions in R using 
the glm function and successive difference contrasts. I conducted the binary logistic regressions 
for explanations citing race, gender, occupation, and attitude and used accountability and judicial 
history and their interactions as predictors.  There were no significant main effects or significant 
interactions for any of the four coded categories.   
 Because gender and race were not mentioned enough times for any meaningful 
significance testing, I will only be reporting the specific effects of accountability, instructions, 
and their interactions on occupation and attitude.  Accountability did not predict if venirepersons 
justified their exclusions stating occupation, β = 0.28, SE = 0.45, z = 0.62, p = 0.53, OR =1.32, 
95% CI [0.54, 3.27}.  Judicial history did not predict if venirepersons justified their exclusions 
stating occupation.  There was no difference between participants in the judicial overrule 
condition and judicial uphold condition in predicting occupation for a stated justification, β = -
0.32, SE = 0.57, z =  -0.57, p = 0.57, OR = 0.72, 95% CI [0.22, 2.24].  Similarly, there was no 
difference between participants who did not receive any judicial information and those in the 
judicial overrule condition in predicting occupation for a stated justification, β = 0.47, SE= 0.56, 
z = 0.84, p = 0.40, OR = 1.60, 95% CI [0.54, 5.00].  The interactions between accountability and 
judicial history were also not significant predictors in participants stating occupation for a reason 
for exclusion. 
 Accountability and judicial history were not significantly related to participants justifying 
their exclusions stating venireperson attitude.  Specifically, accountability did not predict if 
venirepersons justified their exclusions by citing the venirepersons’ attitude, β = 0.27, SE = 0.55, 
z = 0.85, p = 0.62, OR =1.31, 95% CI [0.45, 4.44].  Judicial history did not predict if 
venirepersons justified their exclusions stating occupation.  There was no difference between 
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participants in the judicial overrule condition and judicial uphold condition in predicting attitude 
for a stated justification, β = 0.62, SE = 0.73, z = 0.85, p = 0.39, OR = 1.86, 95% CI [0.47, 
10.03].  Similarly, there was no difference between participants who did not receive any judicial 
information and those in the judicial overrule condition in predicting attitude for a stated 
justification, β = -0.76, SE = 0.71, z = -1.07, p = 0.28, OR= 0.47, 95% CI [0.09, 1.74].  The 
interactions between accountability and judicial history were also not significant predictors for 


















Chapter 9: Discussion 
 I investigated whether accountability and judicial record affected racial bias in 
participants’ peremptory challenges decisions.  My first hypothesis was that there would be a 
four-way interaction between accountability, judicial record, venireperson race, and venireperson 
attitude with different patterns of results depending on whether the black venireperson held 
attitudes that were pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or neutral.  Specifically, I predicted when the 
venireperson was Black there would be a three-way interaction of judicial record, accountability, 
and venireperson attitudes that would be different than when the venireperson was White.  When 
the judge had a record of overruling Batson, participants that were not accountable would be 
significantly more likely to dismiss black jurors compared to white jurors than would those 
participants who were accountable, irrespective of the venirepersons’ attitudes.  I predicted that 
participants who were accountable would be influenced by the venirepersons’ attitudes and not 
their race.  I hypothesized that when the judge had a record of upholding Batson challenges, 
venirepersons’ attitudes and not his/her race would affect participants’ decisions, irrespective of 
attorney accountability.  
 My first hypothesis was not supported.  There were no significant interactions among 
accountability, judicial record, venireperson race, and venireperson attitude on attorneys’ ratings 
of the likelihood that they would challenge or final exclusion of venirepersons.  The only 
significant predictor of participants’ ratings of venirepersons and their final exclusion decision 
was venireperson attitude.  Participants excluded pro-defense venirepersons in their final 
decision significantly more often compared to ambiguous or pro-prosecution venirepersons 
regardless of any other manipulation.  When participants were asked how likely they were to use 
a peremptory challenge on venirepersons, pro-defense venireperson received significantly higher 
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scores compared to pro-prosecution or ambiguous venirepersons.  Ambiguous venirepersons 
received significantly higher scores than pro-prosecution venirepersons.  The ratings were 
unrelated to accountability, race, or judicial record. 
 My second hypothesis was that the manipulations would not affect the nature of the 
explanations attorneys provided for dismissing jurors; the frequency of race neutral reasons 
would be near ceiling level.  The results supported this hypothesis but it is important to note that 
this hypothesis was based on the premise that participants would make racially biased decisions 
but not state that race was a motivating factor.  Therefore, although participants justified their 
peremptory challenges by emphasizing the venireperson attitude and not race, it was because 
attitude actually influenced their decisions.  Participants noted venirepersons’ specific answers 
on the on JBS and venirepersons’ occupations as justifications for their decisions.  Only four 
participants mentioned race as the reason for using their peremptory challenge on a venireperson.  
These results are consistent with the HLM results demonstrating attitude was the only significant 
predictor in exclusion and attorney ratings on likelihood to use a peremptory challenge. They are 
also consistent with previous research examining how attorneys justify their decisions during 
Batson challenges by using race-neutral explanations (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010; Grosso & 
O’Brien, 2012; Kennard, 2011; Sommers & Norton, 2007). 
 However, unlike previous research (Sommers & Norton, 2007), race did not influence 
attorneys’ decisions.  There are a number of possibilities for why race did not affect participants’ 
ratings of venirepersons or their peremptory challenges.  The Flexible Correction Model (FCM) 
explains that if a person is aware of the bias he or she may hold and is motivated to inhibit it, he 
or she can attempt to correct for it (Wegener & Petty, 1997). It is possible that participants knew 
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people would be examining their judgments and reading their justifications and therefore 
corrected any biased thoughts or behaviors.   
It may have been transparent that I was examining race and participants could have 
changed their answers, implicitly or explicitly, in hopes of not appearing racist.  Participants who 
were told about a judge’s history with Batson challenges may have realized the nature of the 
study.  If participants knew I was examining race, they may have responded in a socially 
appropriate manner to avoid appearing racist.  However, other research used a forced choice 
methodology and found racial (Sommers & Norton, 2007) and gender discrimination (Norton et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, previous research gave participants an explicit warning against using 
gender as a reason to exclude a juror but it did not decrease gender discrimination (Norton et al., 
2007).  Instead, participants continued to dismiss a female juror at a higher rate than a male juror 
but gave more elaborate justifications for their decision-making. In another study, race affected 
the selection decisions of participants who received a Batson reminder before reviewing potential 
jurors but the racial bias was in the opposite direction of what was predicted; white 
venirepersons were challenged more often than black venirepersons (Kennard, 2011).   
Participants in the present study rated twelve venirepersons, varying not only in race but also 
gender, in an effort to disguise the true nature of the study.  Yet, I did not replicate previous 
findings of racial discrimination despite using an arguably less obvious cover story.  
 Another potential explanation for why there were no effects of race on attorneys’ 
decisions could be the strength of the venireperson attitude manipulation.  Aversive racism 
theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) predicts that unless there is ambiguity, people are less likely 
to exhibit racism.  The theory explains that when people are presented with a situation that can 
obviously been seen as discriminatory, they will avoid appearing racist or making racist 
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decisions.  However, when the situation is ambiguous, people are more likely to favor a white 
person/candidate over a black person/candidate (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 1986). There were clearly pro-defense and pro-prosecution venirepersons therefore 
making race a non-issue and the appropriate behavior was clear.  However, participants’ ratings 
on ambiguous venirepersons were not consistent with aversive racism theory.  I would have 
predicted participants to have rated the likelihood of excusing black and white venirepersons 
who held ambiguous attitudes differently, with black venirepersons’ receiving higher likelihood 
to exclude ratings than white venirepersons).  However, there was no effect of race even for 
those venirepersons with ambiguous attitudes. 
 It is possible that I got attitude effects and Sommers and Norton (2007) and Kennard 
(2011) did not precisely because of the amount of relevant information I provided for each 
potential juror.  Sommers and Norton (2007) and Kennard (2011) described potential jurors in 
just a few sentences indicating their jobs and if they were skeptical of statistics.  Participants in 
those studies had less information to use when deciding which venireperson to excuse and 
therefore could not rely on venireperson attitude in the same way participants in my study did.  
Aversive racism theory would predict that because the two venireperson profiles in Sommers and 
Norton (2007) and Kennard (2011) were ambiguous, neither description clearly favoring the 
defense or prosecution, participants would rely on race to make a decision.  Although Kennard 
(2011) found that participants excused more white venirepersons compared to black 
venirepersons, it could be due to participants attempting to overcorrect their biases. Regardless, 
the distinction in the amount of information participants received is noteworthy not just because 
of the different results but also because in jurisdictions where venireperson information is 
minimal race effects may be more likely to occur. 
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 History is another possible explanation for the different results.  The three recent 
Supreme Court cases upholding Batson (Foster v. Chatman, 2016; Miller-El v. Dretke, 2005; 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 2008) may have affected participants’ jury selection strategies.  When 
Sommers and Norton (2007) conducted their research these Supreme Court decisions had not 
occurred.  Therefore, participants may not have been as aware of possible repercussions for 
making racially biased peremptory challenges.  Participants now may be more attuned to their 
own racial biases and stereotypes and make an effort to control for them.  For example, despite 
using a very similar methodology to that used in the earlier research, Kennard (2011) found race 
effects in the opposite direction with the white venireperson being dismissed more often than the 
black venireperson potentially because of an overcorrection. The higher rate of excluding white 
venirepersons supports the theory that attorneys may be more sensitive to racial discrimination 
and attempt to control for it in ways now that were not present before Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 
and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008).   
Replication issues 
 Psychology is in the midst of a replication crisis after a team of researchers struggled to 
replicate a number of well-known experiments (Nosek et. al., 2015).  The Open Science 
Collaborative (OSC) chose 100 recent papers and each study was conducted one time.  The 
replication teams used the original materials when possible and determined the sample size 
required by using the original effect sizes.  Despite trying to emulate the original experiments as 
much as possible, only about 35 percent of the effects in the new studies were significant at p < 
.05.  Without consistent replication of experimental findings, the fear is that psychologists are 
making Type I errors and finding significant effects when there are actually no effects.  The OSC 
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highlighted two conditions necessary to explore in replication studies: fidelity and power (Irvine, 
Hoffman, & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2018). 
 With respect to fidelity, my study was investigating the same theoretical issues as 
Sommers and Norton (2007) but the methodology was very different.  The current study 
provided more information about the venirepersons, varied gender, and manipulated 
accountability and judicial history whereas Sommers and Norton (2007) did not.  The additional 
variables could have changed how participants responded to the questions.  Another key 
difference in methodology is Kennard (2011) and Sommers and Norton (2007) used a force 
choice methodology with participants choosing between two venirepersons where as I presented 
participants with twelve venirepersons and asked them to rate venirepersons throughout the 
experiment. With respect to fidelity, perhaps it is not surprising that my study did not replicate 
Sommers and Norton (2007) when considering how much our methodologies differed. 
 In addition to fidelity, power plays an important role in replications.   The OSC attempted 
to replicate each of the 100 studies once.  However, a follow-up study, the Many Labs project 
(MLP) had 36 different independent laboratories attempt to replicate each of the original 16 
studies used in OSC (Klein et al., 2014).  The data were pooled and 85% of the original studies 
were successfully replicated.  The MLP had more power to test for effects than the arguably 
underpowered OSC.  The present study was designed to be able to detect a small effect size (d = 
0.20) with an alpha level of 0.80.  I lost some power due to the missing data but even if the 
experiment had the planned power, it may not have been enough to replicate the results from 
Sommers and Norton (2007). 
 The effect sizes in published studies tend to be biased from true population effect sizes 
due to publication bias and selective reporting (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015).  Sommers and 
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Norton (2007) provide odds ratios with p-values however the true effects are possibly better 
discussed in terms of Cohen’s d for each population they tested.  Although there were significant 
differences in dismissing the black juror compared to the white juror in college (p = .03) and law 
student (p < .05) populations the Cohen’s d effect sizes are below 0.20 (a small effect size) for 
both the college (d = 0.17) and law student (d = 0.19) samples.  The attorney sample had the 
largest effect size (d = 0.33) despite not reaching statistical significance (p = .06). However, 
when judgments were collapsed across population type (college students, law students, and 
attorneys), the black juror was significantly more likely to be dismissed compared to the white 
juror (p = .001) with an effect size larger than any single population (d = 0.58). Additionally, 
although Sommers and Norton (2007) provide the number of participants in each population they 
do not provide the number of participants in each cell.  Therefore, it is possible that Sommers 
and Norton (2007) had inflated effect sizes when combining populations.  If so, replicating the 
results with the power in the current study would be nearly impossible. 
 A remaining question is, did Sommers and Norton (2007) capture a true effect and are my 
results indicative of a Type II error or did Sommers and Norton (2007) make a Type 1 error and 
find an effect when there was not any?  Keeping in mind that Kennard’s (2011) methodology 
was close to Sommers and Norton (2007) and failed to replicate bias against Black 
venirepersons, it is arguable that the original finding was due to random error or variables that 
were outside the authors’ control.  However, archival and anecdotal data (Equal Justice Initiative, 
2010; Gabbidon et al., 2008; Grosso & O’Brien, 2012) overwhelmingly suggests that attorneys 
do consider race during voir dire.  It is possible that Sommers and Norton (2007), Kennard 
(2011), and the present research all captured true effects with history, different methodologies, 
and power levels explaining the varying results.   
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Batson in the Future  
 An additional issue to consider is the possibility that attitudes can serve as a proxy for 
race in the real world.  Several common questions on voir dire questionnaires probe for 
information that may be correlated with race.  For example, an attorney can excuse a potential 
juror if they have been a victim of a crime, have a relative in prison, or have had poor 
interactions with police officers.  Although answers to those questions are not directly race-based 
they are not independent from race and may tap into implicit biases.  Black people are less likely 
to trust the criminal justice system (Brigham & Wasserman, 1999) and are more likely to be a 
victim of crime compared to White people (Sherman, 2001).  Attitudes are a legal and legitimate 
reasons to excuse venirepersons.  To the extent that some attitudes are correlated with race, it 
may appear as if attorneys challenged venirepersons because of their race when in fact it was 
their attitudes that attorneys found problematic.   
 Several field studies establishing Black venirepersons being excluded significantly more 
often than White venireperson have not accounted for attitude as a covariate.  For example, data 
from North Carolina show that prosecutors used peremptory challenges significantly more often 
on Black compared to White people (Rose, 1999).  However, there is no mention of excused 
venireperson attitude.  Furthermore, the Equal Justice Initiative’s (2010) report on racially 
motivated peremptory challenges discusses several alarming statistics about the disproportionate 
amount of strikes used to exclude Black people from juries, but it does not mention whether their 
attitudes were detrimental to the prosecution. However, the report does note that prosecutors 
have frequently stated Black venirepersons live in a “high crime” neighborhood or receive food 
stamps.  These factors could impact venirepersons’ attitudes making them less favorable to the 
prosecution, but without data explicitly stating their attitudes, it seems that the prosecution is 
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making race based assumptions about how they would view a case.  The present study found that 
race was not a significant factor in attorney decision-making and that venireperson attitude was 
the only influential factor.  Perhaps if voir dires could extract more information from potential 
jurors, attorneys would look at attitudes as a better predictor of trial outcome compared to race.  
Indeed, although it is a minority-held view, some social psychology scholars believe that 
prejudice is not as rampant in the real world as in the laboratory but rather a part of a liberal bias 
(Redding, 2004).   
It may be time to consider the elimination of peremptory challenges if the law continues 
to allow prosecutors to use race as a proxy for attitudes due to implicit or explicit bias. After the 
Foster v. Chatman (2016) decision, several law reviews expressed disappointment in the 
Supreme Court’s failure to address implicit bias.  For example an article in the Iowa Law review 
stated”…the Court did not acknowledge how attitudes of exclusion are less intentional today and 
more nuances, implicit, and rationalized.  Black defendants in 2016 face prosecutors who are less 
engaged in open discrimination but more likely to be impacted by beliefs and comforted by the 
false rationalization of racial tolerance” (Brayer, 2016). Marder (2017) urged the courts to 
eliminate peremptory challenges precisely because there does not appear to be a solution to 
addressing and correcting for implicit bias.  If extended voir dire does not correct for implicit 
bias and attitudes continue to be a proxy for race, eliminating peremptory challenges is worth 
considering. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 Because participants were not affected by race, I was unable to test if accountability 
reduces bias in jury selection.  Accountability has been successful in reducing discrimination in 
employment settings and the criminal justice system is employing type of accountability both in 
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district attorneys’ offices and through legislation.  A small number of district attorney offices are 
beginning to implement conviction review units.  The Brooklyn district attorney’s office 
implemented the largest Conviction Review Unit in the country in 2014 
(http://brooklynda.org/conviction-review-unit).  Furthermore, the New York State Senate 
recently passed a bill (S2412D) to create a Commission on Prosecutorial Misconduct.  These 
steps could create avenues that make prosecutors accountable.   
 Another limitation could have been using both law students and prosecutors as 
participants.  Ideally, the participant pool would consist of current or former prosecutors who 
have had trial and voir dire experience.  However, there is no guarantee that prosecutors would 
behave similarly in a study and an actual voir dire.  Real cases have stakes that are difficult to 
replicate. Prosecutors receive pressure from victims’ families, the government, the police, and 
their bosses to secure a conviction.  Although we attempted to incentivize participants with a 
monetary bonus, it still pales in comparison to the consequences prosecutors encounter during 
jury selection and a trial.   
Conclusion 
 Although in the present research, participants did not make racially motivated decisions, 
this should not be interpreted as if prosecutors do not consider race during jury selection.  Just 
recently an amicus brief was filed in Muscogee County, Georgia in which 27 out of 27 Black 
jurors were struck by the prosecution in five death penalty cases in the 1970s (Georgia v. Gates, 
1977).  Notably, one of the prosecutors was Douglas Pullen who was also a member of the 
prosecution in Foster v. Chatman (2016).  Perhaps more importantly, racially motivated 
decision-making still affects jury selection and trials.  In Houston County, Alabama from 2005 to 
2009, prosecutors have used peremptory strikes to remove 80% of black venirepersons in cases 
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where the death penalty has been imposed.  As a result, nearly half of the juries were all-white 
and the remaining juries had only one black juror despite the fact that Houston County is 27% 
African-American (Equal Justice Initiative, 2010).  
  Furthermore, even when a Batson challenge is raised, the courts continue to accept 
ridiculous “race neutral” reasons.  As recent as 2004, a Louisiana court allowed a prosecutor to 
strike a black juror whom he thought “looked like a drug dealer”(State v. Crawford, 2004). 
Although it is possible that current laboratory studies are unable to capture what archival data 
demonstrates, decisions like Crawford continue with alarming regularity.  Therefore, it is 

















Participant experience conducting voir dires 
 
ƒ Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 12 5.0 5.0 
2-10 36 15.0 20.0 
11-20 13 5.4 25.4 
21-30 7 2.9 28.3 
31 or more 50 20.8 49.2 
Only mock voir dires 122 50.8 100.0 























White/Caucasian 173 72.1 
Black/African-American 20 8.3 
Hispanic 23 9.6 
Asian 14 5.8 
Other 9 3.8 
Total 239 100 



















Results of models 























Instructions (L2)    



























Race (L1) 0.01 
(0.04) 
  
Accountability x instructions    
















accountability x attitude    
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accountability [Yes-No] x race [W-B] 0.03 
(0.09) 
  
instructions x race    
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x race [W-B] 0.06 
(0.11) 
  
instructions [None-Overrule] x race [W-B] -0.07 
(0.11) 
  
attitude x race    
attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B] 0.02 
(0.11) 
  
attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B] -0.15 
(0.10) 
  
accountability x instructions x attitude    




























accountability x instructions x race    
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x race [W-B] -0.15 
(0.21) 
  
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x race [W-B] 0.29 
(0.21) 
  
accountability x attitude x race    
accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B] 0.06 
(0.21) 
  
accountability [Yes-No] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B] 0.03 
(0.19) 
  
instructions x attitude x race    
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B] 0.16 
(0.26) 
  
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Defense-Ambiguous] x race [W-B] -0.16 
(0.27) 
  
instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B] -0.07 
(0.24) 
  
instructions [None-Overrule] x attitude [Prosecution-Defense] x race [W-B] 0.15 
(0.24) 
  
accountability x instructions x attitude x race    
accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x  




accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x  








accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [Overrule-Uphold] x  




accountability [Yes-No] x instructions [None-Overrule] x  




Random components    
𝜎Residual
2   0.91 0.90 0.25 
𝜎Intercept
2   0.26 0.35 0.93 












Attitude Instructions Accountability Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Ambiguous Uphold No 3.37 (0.16) 3.46 (0.14) 
  Yes 3.22 (0.14) 3.25 (0.13) 
 Overrule No 3.28 (0.14) 3.38 (0.13) 
  Yes 3.50 (0.15) 3.47 (0.14) 
 None No 3.48 (0.15) 3.42 (0.14) 
  Yes 3.29 (0.15) 3.39 (0.14) 
Defense Uphold No 5.75 (0.18) 5.84 (0.16) 
  Yes 5.81 (0.17) 5.84 (0.15) 
 Overrule No 6.01 (0.17) 6.21 (0.14) 
  Yes 5.78 (0.20) 5.93 (0.17) 
 None No 6.32 (0.17) 6.22 (0.16) 
  Yes 5.71 (0.19) 5.85 (0.15) 
Prosecution Uphold No 2.15 (0.17) 1.93 (0.16) 
  Yes 2.03 (0.15) 2.06 (0.15) 
 Overrule No 1.65 (0.15) 1.72 (0.15) 
  Yes 1.91 (0.17) 1.74 (0.16) 
 None No 1.77 (0.16) 1.63 (0.16) 




































Attitude Gender Exclusion Count 
   
Ambiguous Female 6 
Ambiguous Female 5 
Ambiguous Male 6 
Ambiguous Male 7 
   
Defense Female 101 
Defense Female 111 
Defense Male 105 
Defense Male 118 
   
Prosecution Female 2 
Prosecution Female 7 
Prosecution Male 3 
Prosecution Male 6 




   
Justifications for excluding venirepersons 
 
Factor          ƒ 
Race 5 
 Race is the reason 4 
 Race is not the reason 1 
 Gender 0 
        Gender is the reason 0 
        Gender is not the reason 0 
 Occupation 25 
 Pro-defense 20 
        Social worker 15 
        Union organizer 7 
        Midwife 2 
        Yoga instructor 9 
 Pro-prosecution 0 
        Car salesman 0 
        Urologist 0 
        Petroleum geologist 0 
        Farmer 0 
 Ambiguous 1 
        Pilot 0 
        Plumber 0 
        Pawnbroker 1 
        Motel Owner 0 
 Attitudes 222 
 Pro-defense 214 
        Does not believe in circumstantial evidence 85 
        Anti-police/mistrust of criminal justice system 122 
        Concerns about wrongful conviction 50 
        Positive attitude towards Black causes  1 
        Nullification 25 






Appendix A: Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983) 
 
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following: 
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9.  If a majority of the evidence, but not all of it, suggests that the defendant committed the 
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10.  If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he 
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Appendix B: Venireperson Profiles 
Juror 1 
Social Worker 
Responses to a pre-voir dire scale are as following: 
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My name is Karima Modjadidi and I am a doctoral candidate at the John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice, in New York City. I am conducting an online study on jury selection under the 
supervision of Dr. Margaret Bull Kovera. We are recruiting prosecutors and law students from 
all over the country.  In order to qualify as a law student, you must have participated in a mock 
voir dire, taken a course or seminar about jury selection and /litigation.  I was wondering if you 
and/or your office would be willing to participate in our study.  
 
Results of this study will be disseminated in peer reviewed psycholegal journals, such as Law 
and Human Behavior, and results will be published as aggregate data; attorneys’ names will 
never be linked to their data. This project is funded by the American Psychology-Law Society 
and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.  
 
The study takes approximately 30 minutes to complete and guarantees $35 and potential for 
$50 (through PayPal or Venmo). Participants will be asked to read a short trial summary and 
potential juror profiles, and then asked to answer some brief questions about the potential jurors. 
Interested parties can contact the researcher for this study, Karima Modjadidi, 
at kmodjadidi@jjay.cuny.edu. For more information on Dr. Kovera, you can visit her website 
at: http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~mkovera/. 
  
Survey responses will be entirely anonymous.  For your convenience the study can be 
accessed online at https://gccunyep.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6Rx3ducEwMPfB
 9r 
 
Finally, if you know other prosecutors or law students who may be interested in 
participating please feel free to forward them this letter or survey link.  If you have any 
questions about this research, please feel free to contact me at kmodjadidi@jjay.cuny.edu. 
 




Karima Modjadidi, MA 
Doctoral Candidate 
John Jay College 






Appendix D: Participant Instructions 
You will be playing the role of a prosecuting attorney conducting a jury selection for an 
armed burglary case. You will first read a case summary and then be presented with 
information about twelve potential jurors on your panel. Please rate how likely it is that 
you would use a peremptory challenge on each potential juror.  At the end you will be 
able to use two peremptory challenges.  Please select two jurors that you would like to 
excuse from the jury. 
YOU ARE ELIGIBLE FOR A $15 BONUS IF YOUR FINAL SELECTION MATCHES 
THE TWO POTENTIAL JURORS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RATED BY 
ATTORNEYS AS THE LEAST FAVORABLE TO THEIR CASE.  
Below is a summary of the case:   
Trial Number:    98210-12-100 
Location:     San Antonio, Texas 
Charge:    One Count of Battery with Serious Bodily Injury 
Defendant:    André Barkley, 6’0”, 175 lbs., African-American male, 25 years-old 




The prosecution claims that on the night of September 14, 2016, the defendant, 
André Barkley broke into the home of Matthew Clinton at approximately 10:00PM.  Mr. 
Clinton came down the stairs into the dark living room and confronted Mr. Barkley 
threatening to call 911.  Mr. Barkley grabbed a nearby lamp and repeatedly hit the victim 
with it.  The victim suffered a concussion, a broken eye socket, 4 broken ribs, 3 broken 
fingers, and several other cuts and bruises. 
Although Mr. Clinton could not identify the defendant, the police investigation 
revealed several hairs near the crime scene matching Mr. Barkley. Additionally, two 
blood drops containing DNA matching Mr. Barkley were collected on the living room 
rug.  The prosecution claims the defendant cut himself on the broken glass resulting from 




The defense claims that because there was no positive identification it is possible 
that someone else was the attacker.  The defense questions the validity of the DNA 
results. 
 
PLEASE INDICATE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT YOU WOULD USE YOUR 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE FOLLOWING POTENIAL JURORS.  
REMEMBER THAT YOU ARE PROSECUTING THE CASE. 
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Appendix E: Consent 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
Psychology 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Title of Research Study: Attorney Decision-Making Study 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Margaret Kovera 









The purpose of this research study is to examine how attorneys make decisions during voir dire.  
We  cannot  tell  you  every  detail  of  this  study  ahead  of  time,  but  if  you  are  willing  to  p
articipate 





Procedures:   
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following: 
 
• Read a summary of case facts 
• Read descriptions of potential jurors 
• Make decisions about potential jurors 




Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 30 minutes. 
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts:  
 
The foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study are minimal, but if you feel 
uncomfortable answering a question you can skip it and proceed to the next question 
Potential Benefits:  
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• This study benefits society by providing information about how current and future 
attorneys make decisions. 
 
 
Payment for Participation:  
You will receive $35.00 for your participation with a possibility of receiving an additional $15.  
You will need a PayPal or Venmo account to receive payment.  Your answers will not be linked 
to your account.  At the end of the study you will be asked for payment information. 
 
New Information: 
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your 
willingness to participate in a timely manner. 
 
Confidentiality:  
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected 
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only with 
your permission or as required by law. 
 
We will not collect any identifying information during the course of this study. Any information 
obtained in connection with this study will be strictly confidential. In any written reports or 
publications, no one will be identified or identifiable and only aggregate data will be presented. 
Research records will be kept on a password protected computer; only the researchers will have 
access to the records. Your PayPal or Venmo ID number will be stored separately from your 
responses to the questions that you will be asked. 
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of 
research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research 
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information 
about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by 
name. 
 
Participants’ Rights:  
 
• Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to 
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled. 
 
 
• You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any 
time, without any penalty. 
 
Questions, Comments or Concerns:  








Margaret Bull Kovera 
Professor of Psychology 
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or 
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the 
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu. 
Alternately, you can write to: 
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 




Clicking on the “AGREE” button below indicates: 
 
-You have read the above information 
-You voluntarily agree to participate in this study 
-You are at least 18 years of age 
 
 
If you do not wish to participate in the study, please decline participation by clicking on the 











Appendix F: Executed Latin Square 
























P B F PBF 1   2 1 1   2 1 1   2 1 
P B M PBM   2 1 1   2 1 1   2 1 1 
P W F PWF 2 1 1   2 1 1   2 1 1   
P W M PWM 1 1   2 1 1   2 1 1   2 
D B F DBF 2 2     2 2     2 2     
D B M DBM 2     2 2     2 2     2 
D W F DWF     2 2     2 2     2 2 
D W M DWM   2 2     2 2     2 2   
A B F ABF   1 1 2   1 1 2   1 1 2 
A B M ABM 1 1 2   1 1 2   1 1 2   
A W F AWF 1 2   1 1 2   1 1 2   1 






Appendix G: Coding Scheme for Justifications 
 
A Race- 
A1 Race is the reason I excluded 
A2 Race is NOT the reason I excluded 
B gender 
B1 gender is the reason I excluded 
B2 gender is NOT the reason I excluded 
C occupation  
C1  pro-defense occupation noted  
 C1.1 Social worker 
 C1.2 Union Organizer 
 C1.3 Midwife 
 C1.4 Yoga instructor 
C2 pro-prosecution occupation noted  
 C2.1 Car Salesman 
 C2.2 Urologist 
 C2.3 Petroleum Geologist 
 C2.4 Farmer 
C3 ambiguous occupation noted 
 C3.1 Pilot 
 C3.2 Plumber 
 C3.3 Pawnbroker 
 C3.4 Motel Owner 
D. Attitudes/answers to the questions asked 
D1 pro-defense  
 D1.1 doesn’t believe in circumstantial evidence 
 D1.2 anti-police/mistrust of CJ system 
 D1.3 concerns about wrongful conviction 
 D1.4 positive attitude towards blacks or causes supporting them (BLM) 
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